Resumen El propósito de este trabajo de carácter exploratorio, basado en los planteamientos de la pragmática sociocultural, es investigar las relaciones que se establecen entre la ironía verbal y las actividades de imagen en los intercambios entre políticos y ciudadanos en Twitter. A través del análisis de dos corpus de mensajes publicados en esta red, tratamos de ahondar en el estudio de la ironía y en la modalidad y direccionalidad de los efectos sociales que esta puede tener sobre la imagen (...) y el rol social de los interactuantes. Asimismo, analizamos los efectos del comportamiento irónico en relación con las categorías de afiliación y autonomía, y de afiliación exacerbada y refractariedad. Los resultados muestran que, en este contexto político-ideológico, la ironía es multidireccional y tiene dos tipos de efectos: negativo o positivo, en función de la afiliación del hablante hacia un determinado grupo ideológico, así como de su rol social en el microblog. (shrink)

Lia Formigari propone un recorrido en este libro que permite examinar ampliamente las teorías lingüísticas del Romanticismo alemán y su relación de continuidad y ruptura con los presupuestos de la Ilustración, así como con el nacimiento de la lingüística histórica en Europa. La lógica del pensamiento vivo es una obra que abarca un breve pero intenso periodo de la historia de la filosofía y de las teorías sobre el lenguaje, cubriendo la actividad filosófica de autores tan diversos como Hamann, Herder, (...) Humboldt, Schelling y los hermanos Schlegel. (shrink)

El libro La opinión pública en la red. Análisis pragmático de la voz de los ciudadanos de Ana Mancera Rueda y Ana Pano Alamán pertenece a la colección “Lengua y sociedad en el mundo hispánico” que publica investigaciones sobre las lenguas ibero-románicas y sobre aquellas con las cuales entran en contacto. Este libro tiene como objeto de estudio las manifestaciones lingüísticas que permiten la configuración de la opinión pública en las redes sociales en el marco teórico que le (...) proveen el Análisis del Discurso y la Pragmática Lingüística. (shrink)

Neste trabalho são apresentados dados e reflexões sobre a proposta pedagógica de Ensino Médio Politécnico, implantada desde 2012 nas escolas públicas estaduais do Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil. Tendo como pano de fundo as concepções do Educar pela Pesquisa e da Interdisciplinaridade - eixos norteadores da parte diversificada denominada Seminário Integrado -, a investigação teve cunho qualitativo, apresentando inferências sobre as compreensões acerca do conceito de pesquisa alcançadas pelos estudantes. As intervenções pedagógicas da investigação foram desenvolvidas em quatro turmas (...) de uma escola em Porto Alegre, capital do Rio Grande do Sul, encaminhadas no início do ano letivo de 2015. Por meio da análise qualitativa das falas dos alunos, da identificação da ampliação da complexidade dos seus respectivos mapas conceituais, confeccionados no software CmapTools, assim como da avaliação quanto à profundidade dos projetos encaminhados, pôde-se evidenciar ampla evolução nas compreensões dos alunos quanto ao conceito de pesquisa, percebendo-se assim que a metodologia aplicada nessa investigação foi profícua. (shrink)

El libro La opinión pública en la red. Análisis pragmático de la voz de los ciudadanos de Ana Mancera Rueda y Ana Pano Alamán pertenece a la colección “Lengua y sociedad en el mundo hispánico” que publica investigaciones sobre las lenguas ibero-románicas y sobre aquellas con las cuales entran en contacto. Este libro tiene como objeto de estudio las manifestaciones lingüísticas que permiten la configuración de la opinión pública en las redes sociales en el marco teórico que le (...) proveen el Análisis del Discurso y la Pragmática Lingüística. (shrink)

In this article, we explore whether cross-linguistic differences in grammatical aspect encoding may give rise to differences in memory and cognition. We compared native speakers of two languages that encode aspect differently (English and Swedish) in four tasks that examined verbal descriptions of stimuli, online triads matching, and memory-based triads matching with and without verbal interference. Results showed between-group differences in verbal descriptions and in memory-based triads matching. However, no differences were found in online triads matching and in memory-based triads (...) matching with verbal interference. These findings need to be interpreted in the context of the overall pattern of performance, which indicated that both groups based their similarity judgments on common perceptual characteristics of motion events. These results show for the first time a cross-linguistic difference in memory as a function of differences in grammatical aspect encoding, but they also contribute to the emerging view that language fine tunes rather than shapes perceptual processes that are likely to be universal and unchanging. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I evaluate the coherence of Nietzsche's thought given a logical elaboration of the implications entailed by his embryonic insights into perspectivism, genealogy, and differential analysis. I argue that, given these, Nietzsche's critique of western culture is flawed in that it is based on two assumptions which the above show to be illegitimate: that life has certain perspective-independent features that can function as transcultural standards by which to measure the biological worth of any given form and of their (...) respective values; and that he has privileged access to these features. I go on to argue that this conflict between the critical/epistemic dimension of his thinking--i.e., those elements that elaborate his anti-dogmatism--and that forming his cultural criticism--in fact, a distinctly apocalyptic, salvational and thus dogmatic dimension--is not only irreducible, but severely compromises the integrity of his thought. Furthermore, I argue that, under the assumption that dogmatic positions are internally compromised if one is interested in generating a philosophically defensible point of view out of Nietzsche's thought, rather than examine it as a piece of intellectual history, one must move to excise from it those elements which are inconsistent with its anti-dogmatic, anti-metaphysical, and anti-foundational elements. This, I argue, generates a philosophical position which, though limited in scope, provides one with a justifiable account of the human world, one which in many respects reflects the self-understanding of postmodern microcommunitarian. (shrink)

Archival art has been discussed so far in spatial terms, as archival installation, emphasizing stability of content and narrativity. Performative archiving is introduced here as intervention practice producing empowered public spheres in the context of a generalized network archival culture. These archiving practices do not produce content, but dispositives that enable the recension of archival data in distributed processes, not unlike oral forms and rituals of transmission of knowledge. Synchronicity of performance, in distant or person-to-person encounters, creates the possibility of (...) contesting co-utterances. Such works experiment on new forms of participation and collective writing, determining the roles and responsibility of subjects during the development of archival time, regulating different levels of interaction among persons, social groups, institutions, practices, thematic areas, media, physical and virtual spaces. They are centrifugal processes that resist the thematization of the archive and its confinement within the discourse of art. Their intervention aims at a different mode of instituting in the world of art, which problematizes the local conditions of social spaces and cultural institutions. They shift our interest away from archival accumulation and preservation, away from the ‘ideology of the trace’, and towards the moment of speech and act that bears the ‘capacity to aspire’. While they are triggered by an intention to actively institute, to organize tactics of action, they insist on the political performance of ‘act and speech’ at the moment when they occur. (shrink)

Locating the position of the Delphic hippodrome is a long‑standing question in the archaeology of the site. The suggestions made so far by early modern travellers and contemporary researchers have not yielded results, and thus it is considered to be lost in the alluvial soils of the Chrisso olive groves. In general, our inability to spot ancient Greek hippodromes is due to their lack of monumental structures, as they were situated in any suitable, naturally landscaped space. The site of Gonia, (...) 1 km north of Itea in the southwestern part of the Kirrha plain, matches the information gleaned from the ancient literary sources for this monument, from Pindar to Pausanias, and brings together all the features required for an ancient hippodrome: the elongated space of about 1 km in length would easily fit the racing grounds themselves, its dimensions corresponding to those known from the Olympic racecourse. The flat area is surrounded by natural slopes on three of its four sides, ideal for spectators' stands, where stone seats have been spotted, carved into the bedrock. At the northern end, the grounds appear amphitheatrical; a roughly‑made column drum found there appears similar to that from the Lykaion racecourse, generally identified as the base of a turning‑post. The new find signals a breakthrough in our knowledge of ancient Greek hippodromes, calls for a re‑evaluation of the question of the Archaic stadium at Delphi and its location, and, further, invites consideration regarding the number of participants in equestrian events. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAlthough formative of modern value theory, the moral beauty view—which states that moral virtue is beautiful and moral vice is ugly—is now mostly neglected by philosophers. The two contemporary defences of the view mostly capitalize on its intuitive attractiveness, but to little avail: such considerations hardly convince sceptics of what is nowadays a rather unpopular view. Historically, the view was supported by thought experiments; and although these greatly increase its plausibility, they also raise empirical questions, which they leave unanswered. Here, (...) I offer a novel defence of the moral beauty view, capitalizing on empirical evidence and arguing via an inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

Proposes that postmodernist inquiries regarding power and authority have contributed to the adoption by some psychologists of discursive stances that are fundamentally ethical. Two of the most important schools defined by their employment of an ethical logic are feminist psychology and multicultural therapy, both of which offer "ethico-therapeutic" treatment modalities to clients perceived to be suffering from psychological wounds caused by some kind of power inequity. Essential to the success of such therapy for clients is the demand by psychologists for (...) changes not only from clients, but from the general society. The authors conclude that the continued development of ethical discourses within psychology may help to meet many of the challenges to psychological well-being in the postmodern era. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The infinite-valued semantics was introduced in Rondogiannis and Wadge (2005) as a purely logical way for capturing the meaning of well-founded negation in logic programming. The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to give a non-technical introduction to the infinite-valued semantics; second, to discuss the applicability of the infinite-valued approach to syntactically richer extensions of logic programming; and third, to present the main open problems whose resolution would further enhance the applicability of the technique.

La publication de trois amphores panathénaïques de la fin du Ve siècle et du début du ive siècle, découvertes à Praisos, fournit l'occasion de remarques concernant les scènes de proclamation des vainqueurs et de remise des prix dans la céramique attique. L'auteur souligne aussi le rôle des joueurs de trompette, met en lumière des exemples de représentation narrative sur des amphores panathénaïques et propose des remarques iconographiques et techniques concernant les vases panathénaïques de cette époque.

I offer a set of sufficient conditions for beauty, drawing on Parsons and Carlson’s account of ‘functional beauty’. First, I argue that their account is flawed, whilst falling short of...

There is a tendency in contemporary (analytic) aesthetics to consider- ably restrict the scope of things that can be beautiful or ugly. This peculiarly modern tendency is holding back progress in aesthetics and robbing it of its potential contribution to other domains of inquiry. One view that has suffered neglect as a result of this tendency is the moral beauty view, whereby the moral virtues are beautiful and the moral vices are ugly. This neglect stems from an assumption to the (...) effect that virtues and vices simply cannot be beautiful or ugly. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it develops an account of form, under which, it argues, possession of form suffices for an object’s candidature for beauty and ugliness. Second, it argues that, under the foregoing proposal, the moral beauty view turns out to be a coherent position, and so should be taken seriously in both aesthetics and ethics. (shrink)

The present book is an in-depth study of Lukács’ musical aesthetics and, more specifically, of his essay on music from The Specificity of the Aesthetic (Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen, 1963). Lukács’ problematic in this essay revolves around a central issue in the history of Aesthetics: the problem of mimesis in music. Since the time of Plato and Aristotle music has been regarded as a mimesis (an imitation) of reality. However, this theory of music as mimesis presents major difficulties which have (...) long been the subject of philosophical thinking: how is it possible that an art so far removed from reality, an art that employs sounds (not images or concepts) be considered as an imitation of reality? This is the main question that concerns Lukács in this essay. The present book seeks, through the detailed examination of Lukács’ central argument, to demonstrate and clarify Lukács’ solution to this problem of musical mimesis and to highlight its significance for the contemporary debate on Aesthetics. (shrink)

Ugliness is a neglected topic in contemporary analytic aesthetics. This is regrettable given that this topic is not just genuinely fascinating, but could also illuminate other areas in the field, seeing as ugliness, albeit unexplored, does feature rather prominently in several debates in aesthetics. This paper articulates a ‘deformity-related’ conception of ugliness. Ultimately, I argue that deformity, understood in a certain way, and displeasure, jointly suffice for ugliness. First, I motivate my proposal, by locating a ‘deformity-related’ conception of ugliness in (...) aesthetic tradition, offering examples in support, and rejecting related alternative suggestions. Second, I argue that the proposal boasts considerable merits. Not only does it capture much of what we ordinarily think of as ugly, but it also comprises an objective criterion for ugliness, offers unity and comprehensiveness, and is informative and explanatorily potent. Third, I discuss a number of objections, thereby demonstrating that the proposal withstands reflective scrutiny. (shrink)

According to immoralists, some artworks are better aesthetically in virtue of their immorality. A. W. Eaton recently offered a novel defence of this view, seeking to overcome shortcomings in previous accounts, thereby occasioning a reconsideration of immoralism. Yet, as I argue in this paper, Eaton’s attempt is unsuccessful, insofar as it consists partly of inadequately supported claims, and partly—and more interestingly, albeit paradoxically––of covert moralist assumptions that are, eo ipso, incompatible with immoralism. I then turn to a parallel debate in (...) ethics concerning the possibility of admirable immorality, suggesting that a consideration of the state of that debate further supports my argument against immoralism. I close by suggesting some strategies by which immoralists may offer a rejoinder, although I note that their prospects are rather dim, not least because available defences of immoralism and similar positions all seem to share the same flawed pattern. (shrink)

This paper discusses awareness systems for supporting informal social relationships, focusing on some of they key concerns for designers and researchers. The discussion is general, but examples highlight the design issues discussed and summarize related empirical results. The paper argues in favor of automated capture of awareness information and suggests that social intelligence is relevant (a) as a design and evaluation criterion for such systems and (b) as a mechanism for supporting users in managing the information sharing by means of (...) awareness systems. (shrink)

We have all heard people say ‘Beauty is only skin-deep’, or ‘Beauty is in the eye of the beholder’: our culture promulgates a conception of beauty as subjective, superficial, and independent of other values like moral goodness or knowledge and understanding. Yet our taste in beauty affects many aspects of our lives, sometimes playing a decisive – and often detrimental – role in areas as wide-ranging as our identity and self-esteem, our morally salient decisions, and our relationship to the environment. (...) This presents us with a choice: we can either ignore the facts – leaving our conception of beauty unchanged and allowing our taste to influence much in our lives while either not acknowledging such influence, or perhaps seeking to reprimand it; or we can take the power of beauty seriously and seek to harmonise our taste with our values. I argue for the latter option and propose a way of bringing beauty and taste in line with what matters to us using the notion of functional beauty. Adopting this strategy, I suggest, can have a powerful – and positive – impact on our self-esteem and wellbeing, our relationship to others, as well as our attitudes towards the environment. (shrink)

Departing on a demonstration which aims to show to young Cleinias how one ought to care about wisdom and virtue, Socrates asks at 278e2 whether people want to do well (εὐ πράττειν). Εὐ πράττειν is ambiguous. It can mean being happy and prospering, or doing what is right and doing it well. Socrates will later exploit this ambiguity, but at this point he uses this expression merely to announce his conviction that every human being (pathological cases aside, perhaps) desires to (...) be happy (278e2-7). He does not examine how this desire figures in the psychology of action. Instead, and more fundamentally, he seeks to identify the things that would make us happy, or the good things as he calls them (279a2-4). In this passage, only those things are said to be good that make their possessor happy. Socrates does not present his view on what it is to be happy. But he goes on to advance confidently controversial claims about which things are good for us to possess and which are not. In and of itself, this implies that he has a view on happiness which enables him to identify these things, even though he does not offer an explicit statement of it. Here, I attempt to articulate the conception of happiness that is presupposed by Socrates in this passage. Since he does not reveal it explicitly, I will have to use the information he offers in which it is revealed implicitly. More precisely, I am going to ask what sort of a conception of happiness and unhappiness we need to attribute to Socrates in order to explain adequately his claims about what makes us happy and unhappy. To test the adequacy of the articulation I develop, I examine whether it can help us make sense of these claims and his defence for them. The same test of adequacy I apply also to some influential interpretations already on offer. (shrink)

Linda Zagzebski recently put forward a new theory, moral exemplarism, that is meant to provide an alternative to theories like consequentialism and deontology, and which proposes to define key moral terms by direct reference to exemplars. The theory’s basic structure is straightforward. A virtuous person is defined as a person like that, where that points to individuals like Leopold Socha, Confucius, Jesus Christ, and so on. A key component of this theory is the function played by the emotions, specifically the (...) emotion of admiration, which helps us identify moral exemplars, inspires our emulation of them, and grounds moral motivation. In other words, admiration tracks persons like that. The aim of this article is to show that unless moral exemplarism recognises and incorporates an aesthetic dimension to morality, as did, for instance, eighteenth-century sentimentalists by recognising the categories of moral beauty and ugliness, the theory suffers important theoretical difficulties, whilst failing to yield some of the theoretical merits that it boasts. To this end, I will cast doubt on the prominent role accorded to the emotion of admiration for morality, arguing that it has to either be qualified as a specific kind of admiration––namely that which takes the beautiful as its object––or be replaced altogether with the affective response to the beautiful, a mark of which is pleasure or delight in the contemplation of an object. In short, an aesthetics of character is necessary in order to properly theorise the affective and motivational components of morality under an exemplarist framework. (shrink)

Considerable progress in personality and social psychology has been largely ignored by philosophers, many of whom still remain sceptical concerning whether the conception of character presupposed by virtue theory is descriptively adequate. Here, I employ the five-factor model of personality, currently the consensus view in personality psychology, to respond to a strong reading of the situationist challenge, whereby most people lack dispositions that are both cross-situationally consistent and temporally stable. I show that situationists rely on a false dichotomy between character (...) traits and situations, and that evidence supports the empirical adequacy of the sorts of character traits presupposed by virtue ethics. Additionally, I suggest that the personality traits of the five-factor model are relevant to virtue theory, in so far as they are malleable, morally salient, and seem to structurally parallel Aristotelian virtues and vices. Thus, contra situationism, the five-factor model supports the descriptive adequacy of a virtue-theoretical framework. (shrink)

Vardanyan’s Theorems [36, 37] state that $\mathsf {QPL}(\mathsf {PA})$ —the quantified provability logic of Peano Arithmetic—is $\Pi ^0_2$ complete, and in particular that this already holds when the language is restricted to a single unary predicate. Moreover, Visser and de Jonge [38] generalized this result to conclude that it is impossible to computably axiomatize the quantified provability logic of a wide class of theories. However, the proof of this fact cannot be performed in a strictly positive signature. The system $\mathsf (...) {QRC_1}$ was previously introduced by the authors [1] as a candidate first-order provability logic. Here we generalize the previously available Kripke soundness and completeness proofs, obtaining constant domain completeness. Then we show that $\mathsf {QRC_1}$ is indeed complete with respect to arithmetical semantics. This is achieved via a Solovay-type construction applied to constant domain Kripke models. As corollaries, we see that $\mathsf {QRC_1}$ is the strictly positive fragment of $\mathsf {QGL}$ and a fragment of $\mathsf {QPL}(\mathsf {PA})$. (shrink)

Drawing from Goffman’s original observations on stigma and the consequences of interactions between the stigmatized and supportive or stigmatizing audiences, we conduct a 20-year review of the diverse literature on stigma to revisit the collective nature of stigmatization processes. We find that studies on stigma’s origins, responses, processes, and outcomes have diverged from Goffman’s relational view of stigma as they have overlooked important relational mechanisms explaining the processes of (de)stigmatization. We draw from those conclusions to justify the need to study (...) stigma as a collective phenomenon. We develop a relational perspective on stigma based on understanding how attributes are stigmatized (or not) by audiences in their interactions. We argue that to advance stigma research, it is necessary to build on Goffman’s theory to include the stigmatizers (i.e., the normal) and supporters (i.e., the wise); how they create, sustain, or remove stigma; and how they relate to the stigmatized (i.e., the targets). Accordingly, we provide a research agenda on stigma as a collective phenomenon that theorizes a relational perspective, proposes a typology of how audiences relate to stigmatization, and identifies patterns of relations between audiences. We thus offer a missing piece to existing accounts of stigma by focusing on the key role of audiences (i.e., stigmatizers or supporters of the stigmatized) rather than on the targets of stigma (i.e., the own). (shrink)

According to an interpretation that has dominated the literature, the traditional interpretation as I call it, the recollection argument aims at establishing the thesis that our learning in this life consists in recollecting knowledge the soul acquired before being born into a body, or thesis R, by using the thesis that there exist forms, thesis F, as a premise. These entities, the forms, are incorporeal, immutable, and transcendent in the sense that they exist separately from material perceptibles, which in turn (...) are related to them through participation and by being caused by them in some sense. But the properties of transcendence, immutability and incorporeality are sufficient to signal forms, and so the thesis that there exist forms claims that there exists entities with at least these three properties. In the first section of this paper, I argue that strong textual and more general exegetical reasons suggest that the traditional interpretation is mistaken. Furthermore, this interpretation, as I argue in the second section, fails to credit Plato with a proper argument for recollection. In section III, I present an alternative account of the argument for R in the "Phaedo". At the same time I defend a more general interpretation according to which the metaphysical doctrine Plato offers in the "Phaedo" represents a natural continuation of the philosophical position that stands at the centre of the dialectical conversations we find in the shorter Socratic dialogues. (shrink)

Philosophical aesthetics has recently been expanding its purview—with exciting work on everyday aesthetics, somaesthetics, gustatory aesthetics, and the aesthetics of imperceptibilia like mathematics and human character—reclaiming territory that was lost during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the discipline begun concentrating almost exclusively on the philosophy of art and restricted the aesthetic realm to the distally perceptible. Yet there remains considerable reluctance towards acknowledging the aesthetic character of many of these objects. This raises an important question—partly made salient again by (...) the ongoing expansion of the aesthetic domain, and partly by the fact that many still seem resistant to this aesthetic diversification—which aestheticians seem to avoid: what, if anything, constrains the scope of beauty or the aesthetic? I argue that form, construed as comprising a degree, however minimal, of experienceable complexity, is necessary and sufficient for an object's candidature for the possession of aesthetic properties. Such a condition serves to discriminate between attempts to expand the scope of the aesthetic that are legitimate and those that are not. If correct, my view suggests that the aesthetic realm, though not limitless, is very broad indeed—but this, I think, is as it should be. (shrink)

The article starts with a brief overview of the kinds of approaches that have been attempted for the presentation of Phenomenology’s view on the emotions. I then pass to Husserl’s unsatisfactory efforts to disclose the intentionality of emotions and their intentional correlation with values. Next, I outline the idea of a new, “normalized phenomenological” approach of emotions and values. Pleasure and pain, then, are first explored as affective feelings . In the cases examined, it is shown that, primordially, pleasure and (...) pain are recordings for our bodily and spiritual states resulting from our confrontation with beings and situations in the world. Delight and distress are, subsequently, approached as the first full-fledged emotive acts that animate or intentionally interpret pleasure and pain in specific ways. The elementary values of agreeableness and disagreeableness appear correspondingly to the latter in relation to the very pleasure or pain and to what has caused them. In other words, agreeable and disagreeable show how what we confront in the world weighs for us, what value it has for the embodied intentional consciousness, for its state and functioning as well as for its existentio-praxial possibilities in the lifeworld. (shrink)